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SUPPLEMENTAL REPLY BRIEF 
The allegations in the Counties’ complaint regarding the “2017 assessment” are 
sufficient to demonstrate harm to the Counties’ taxing functions and correlated duties to 
ensure uniformity and equality in taxation with alleged correlated loss of taxable revenue 
to demonstrate justiciability and ripeness.  The Counties’ claims do not arise from a 
specific tax assessment challenged, unchallenged or forgone, but are structurally based 
and stem from the Challenged Laws’ enactment and unconstitutional assessment 
mandated methodology.  They therefore do not depend upon averments of particular 
assessments to maintain this action and the holding set forth in Salt Lake County v. 
Bangerter does not alter or command otherwise here when the Counties challenge the 
constitutionality of relevant tax provisions on their face.   
I. APPELLANTS HAVE SUFFICIENTLY ALLEGED ACTUAL AND 
THREATENED INJURY TO RENDER THIS DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENT ACTION RIPE FOR ADJUDICATION.  
 
In a declaratory judgment action, “the law itself is the issue,” Salt Lake County v. 
Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 385 (Utah 1996), and a declaratory judgment may issue when a 
challenged law gives rise to an “actual or imminent clash of legal rights and obligations 
between the parties.”  Clegg v. Wasatch Cty., 2010 UT 5, ¶ 26, 227 P.3d 1243 (emphasis 
added).  To this end, a controversy is ripe, and a trial court may therefore adjudicate it, 
when the moving party has sufficiently alleged actual or threatened harm.  The Counties 
have alleged both.   
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Here, the Counties challenge a Threshold Law that facially insulates certain airline tax 
assessments from administrative and judicial review; an Allocation Law that presumes a 
starting point for fair market value assessments that fails to capture 100% of the value of 
certain airline property; and a Valuation Law that is designed to advantage large airline 
operators to the detriment of all other taxpayers.  The Counties have not simply 
challenged these laws in hypothetically, or in abstract theory.  But by their Complaint, 
the Counties stated the actual, not merely threatened, impact of the same.  
Namely looking to 2017 alone, the Counties have shown that once the Challenged 
Laws went into effect, the Utah State Tax Commission was forced to abandon the 
valuation method it preferred – a method shown to best capture and value airline property 
according to 100% of its fair market value (R. 000013-000014, Compl. ¶¶ 49-55) – and 
to instead adopt a statutorily derived valuation method, which when applied to all seven 
of the major airlines that operate in Utah, resulted in an overall reduction in taxable value 
between the 2016 and 2017 tax years of 39%, R. 000015, Compl. ¶ 58, and applied to one 
particular airline, resulted in 2017 in a roughly 44% drop in assessed value.  Id., ¶ 59.  
Further, because many of those assessed values fell below the 50% threshold necessary to 
invoke the Tax Commission’s jurisdiction, the Counties were barred from seeking 
administrative review.  See Notice of Supplemental Authority.   
More than merely threaten harm to the Counties – and the taxpayers whose 
interests they represent – the Challenged Laws have created “an actual or imminent clash 
of legal rights and obligations between the parties.” Clegg, 2010 UT 5, ¶ 26.  This clash 
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is not merely hypothetical, but ripe for the trial court to remedy. More importantly, this 
clash in ongoing and applies annually to the central assessments of all benefitted airlines.    
II. APPELLEES’ RELIANCE ON SALT LAKE COUNTY V. BANGERTER 
PROVES TOO MUCH.  
 
Taking it beyond the facts alleged and thus beyond the actual controversy in that 
case, Appellees’ urge this Court to interpret Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384 
(Utah 1996), in a manner that is neither supported by the case itself, nor this Court’s 
declaratory judgment jurisprudence. But misapprehending the breadth of the Court’s 
ruling in Bangerter and disregarding, that there, the Counties sought to challenge a 
different legislative act, which had not then resulted in harm, and which was dubious to 
ever do so, Appellees suggest that in Bangerter this Court created a bright line rule, 
positing that before a county may test the constitutionality of any provision of the tax 
code, the county must first produce a completed tax assessment that has been reduced as 
result of a challenged law.  See Supplemental Brief of Appellees Delta Airlines, Inc. and 
Skywest Airlines, Inc. at pp 5-6; Supplemental Brief of Appellee State of Utah at p. 7.  
Appellees’ contention proves too much.  
A. The Court’s holding in Bangerter supports the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
Counties’ complaint. 
 
This Court’s decision in Salt Lake County v. Bangerter does not create a per se 
rule that to challenge the constitutionality of a tax statute a party must first produce a 
completed assessment. But read in total, not excerpted as Appellees do here, Bangerter 
set down no firm rules pertaining to tax cases.  Rather in Bangerter, this Court stated no 
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more than it has elsewhere; namely, before a party may challenge a law it must show a 
controversy exists.  The Court did not hold, nor intimate, that existence of a completed 
assessment is a universal requirement for a constitutional tax law challenge, but required 
instead, the presence of a threat of harm.  
In Bangerter, the plaintiff counties challenged the Equalization Act, claiming an 
adjustment factor contained in that act, would diminish tax revenues and thereby impact 
county budgets.  Absent from the counties’ challenge were any facts to show a 
diminution in collected revenues.  Contrasted with the facts here, the Court determined 
“from the record before us, no taxpayer has actually received a reduction in his property 
tax under the statute.”  And on those facts the Court found that “[t]o render the 
constitutionality of the [Equalization] Act ripe for adjudication, the Counties must 
produce a tax assessment that has been challenged under the [Act] with a resulting loss of 
revenue. . .”  Id. at 385 (emphasis added).  Put another way, the Court held because the 
counties had not there alleged any harm caused solely by the Equalization Act’s 
enactment nor even demonstrated the likelihood of harm caused by the Act’s application 
in the future, no controversy existed and the matter was not ripe for adjudication. Id.  
Rather than an invoke a new rule that pertains to tax code challenges, the Court’s holding 
repeats the familiar refrain that to challenge any law, a plaintiff must allege actual or 
threatened harm thereunder. In Bangerter, the existence of a completed assessment was 




B. Appellees’ reading of Bangerter conflicts with other decisions by this Court. 
 
Applying Bangerter’s limited holding in an overarching fashion, Appellees’ 
maintain the Counties’ claims (and essentially all constitutional tax law challenges) may 
never be ripe absent a completed assessment challenge in the Tax Commission below.  
Such an expansive reading belies not only Bangerter, but runs afoul of other, controlling 
Utah law.  See e.g. Moon Lake Electric Association, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 
345 P.2d 612 (Utah 1959) (upholding on facial grounds Tax Commission’s refusal to 
apply certain tax statutes the Commission urged violated the Utah Constitution’s 
guarantees of tax uniformity and proportionality); see also Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 
233 (Utah 1979) (entertaining without concern over jurisdiction State Treasurer’s 
challenge to facial constitutionality of certain threshold tax laws); Brumley v. Utah State 
Tax Commission, 868 P.2d 796, 799 (Utah 1993) (holding that declaratory judgment act 
supports a party’s resort to district court to obtain ruling on threshold legal question); 
Kennecott Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 702 P.2d 451, 455 (Utah 1985) (recognizing county 
possessed standing to challenge not merely validity of particular assessment, but the 
constitutionality of the assessment statute and methods in general: “When the 
overvaluation of property has arisen from the adoption of a rule of appraisement which 
conflicts with a constitutional or statutory direction, and operates unequally not merely 
on a single individual but on a large class of individuals or corporations, a party 
aggrieved may resort to a court of equity....” (citing Stanley v. Supervisors of Albany, 121 
U.S. 535, 551 (1887)).   
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Here, the actual enforcement and application of the Challenged Laws by the Tax 
Commission to airline property assessment is at issue.  The State and Airlines admit the 
Challenged Laws are in force and since 2017 have been applied to the Commission’s 
assessment of airline property. (R. 000001-000030, Compl. ¶¶ 1, 14.); (State of Utah’s 
Answer, R. 000260-000271, ¶¶ 1, 14); (Answer by Intervenor Airlines, R. 000610-
000622, ¶¶ 1, 14, 53.)  And though now attempting to distance themselves from those 
prior admissions; contending here the Counties failed to state with particularity the 
Challenged Laws’ application to a completed assessment, such distinction is without 
difference. (State’s Supplemental Brief at pp. 6-9.)  Simply, the complaint adequately 
put Appellees on notice of the actual harm.  
Instead, and consistent with the counties in Kennecott, the Counties here, 
challenge rules of appraisement and bars to entry, which “conflict[ ] with a constitutional 
or statutory direction, and operate[ ] unequally not merely on a single individual but on a 
large class of individuals or corporations,” such that they may resort directly to a court of 
equity for their relief.  Id., 702 P.2d at 455. The alleged omission of a more 
particularized or affirmative statement that the Challenged Laws have been applied in a 
manner that causes harm vis a vis a completed assessment does not alter the fact the 
Challenged Laws are in force and applied by the Commission in every assessment of 
airline property, including those in 2017. 
As this Court has explained “[a] plaintiff may seek and obtain a declaration as to 
whether a statute is constitutional by averring in his pleading the grounds upon which he 
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will be directly damaged in his person or property by its enforcement; by alleging facts 
indicating how he will be damaged by its enforcement; that defendant is enforcing such 
statute or has a duty or ability to enforce it; and the enforcement will impinge upon 
plaintiff's legal or constitutional rights.” Baird v. State, 574 P.2d 713, 716 (Utah 1978); 
Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145, 1148 (Utah 1983). Indeed, “a law may be facially 
attacked whenever it causes injury to a particular plaintiff” either through harm caused by 
the statute’s enactment or through its application. Gillmor v. Summit County, 2010 UT 
69, ¶ 33, 246 P.3d 102 (differentiating between statutes that cause harm through their 
enactment - e.g. a statutory regulatory taking - and those that cause harm through their 
application and holding it is the articulated harm, not whether the challenge is facial or 
applied, that demonstrates ripeness.)  See also Salt Lake City Corp. v. Property Tax Div. 
of Utah State Tax Com’n., 1999 UT 41, ¶ 17, 979 P.2d 346 (holding Salt Lake City stated 
distinct and palpable injury sufficient to confer standing by alleging it had been deprived 
of taxable aircraft value and thus taxable base as result of unconstitutional and illegal 
apportionment methodology). Here, the Counties’ have sufficiently alleged harm to their 
protectable interest caused by the Challenged Laws’ enactment – the abridgement of the 
Counties taxing functions and correlated duties to ensure uniformity and equality in 
taxation – because on their face the Challenged Laws prescribe an unconstitutional, non-
uniform and inaccurate fair market assessment of airline property. (Appellant’s 




C. Adopting the bright line rule that Appellees suggest eviscerates the principles 
that underlie this Court’s exhaustion case law. 
 
Generally a party must exhaust applicable administrative remedies before seeking 
judicial review.  But exceptions to this rule exist when exhaustion serves no useful 
purpose.  See Johnson v. Utah State Ret. Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980).  
Pertinent here, this Court has recognized that exhaustion is not required in the  area of 
taxation when only pure questions of law exist:  “It is not for the Tax Commission to 
determine questions of legality or constitutionality of legislative enactments . . . Th[o]se 
questions, however, [can] be raised by an independent action in a district court . . .”  
Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Comm’n, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 23, 34 P.3d 180, 184 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). Adopting the bright line rule urged by Appellees 
and requiring a completed assessment in every instance in which a tax law is challenged, 
creates in the area of tax law, alone a de facto rule of exhaustion.  Doing so upends the 
principles set out in Nebeker and the cases that rest on it.  It also frustrates the ends of 
judicial economy.  See State Tax Comm’n v. Wright, 596 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1979) 
(finding exception to doctrine of administrative exhaustion guards against needless, time-
consuming and wasteful case-by-case challenges to laws the Commission lacks authority 
to decide) (citing Shea v. State Tax Commission, 101 Utah 209, 212, 120 P.2d 274, 275 
(1941); see also Nebeker, 2001 UT 74, ¶ 23.  All the while, the Challenged Laws are 
applied pursuant to their express language to every assessment.        
Moreover, suggesting - as Appellees must - that a bright line rule advances the 
ends of justice by creating a record for the district court’s “de novo” review, presumes the 
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Counties possess the ability to challenge the airlines’ assessments in all instances. This 
assumption, however, is unsupported and precluded by the challenged statutory scheme. 
As previously stated, the Threshold Law, ab initio, denies taxing entities—and the 
taxpayer’s they represent—the ability to appeal certain valuations that they reasonably 
believe fall below fair market value yet fail to meet the jurisdictional threshold. See Utah 
Code § 59-2-1007(2)(b). And without the ability to administratively appeal an 
assessment, the Counties right to have a law’s constitutionality determined would be 
eliminated, thereby infringing and prohibiting the Counties’ constitutional duties to 
ensure and protect against the unequal and non-uniform taxing structure promulgated by 
the Challenged Laws. (Appellant’s Supplemental Brief at p. 12.)  
CONCLUSION 
Here, the Counties have sufficiently alleged an actual and imminent clash of legal 
rights and obligations between the parties. The Counties’ challenges are not merely 
hypothetical.  They are abundant, present on the face of the challenged laws, and 
evident from the 2017 tax assessments that operation of the challenged laws produced. 
The Counties’ case presents a ripe controversy over which the trial court may properly 
exercise jurisdiction. Dismissing the Counties’ appeal and upholding the trial court’s 
ruling will frustrate, not advance the ends of justice. The trial court’s authority to render 
constitutional determinations of the Challenged Laws should be upheld, and contrary to 
Appellees’ contentions, remains irrespective of “whether or not further relief is or could 
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be claimed.”  Gray v. Defa, et al., 135 P.2d 251, 254 (Utah 1943) (holding that 
declaratory relief may be given in a separate proceeding) (emphasis in original).     
Dated this 8th day of August 2019. 
 
By:/s  Bridget K. Romano    
Deputy District Attorney 
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